CODEBOOK

GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES

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Oxford, 2004
Introduction:

This codebook describes the contents of the Governments in European Semi-Presidential Regimes dataset. The dataset comprises information on the governments formed in fifteen East and West European countries, which have or had semi-presidential regimes for some time between 1945 and Dec 2003. Since the dataset is designed to enable the study of governments in democratic semi-presidential regimes, a threshold for inclusion in the dataset is applied. Countries are included during time periods in which they reach the mid-scale value of .5 or better on either the Freedom House or the Polity scales (both normalised to a 0-1 range, where 0 denotes complete lack of democracy and 1 fully fledged democratic procedures). The countries included in the dataset are Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine. For the West European countries information is collected from the time the first government is formed post World War II, or from the time the first government is formed after the adoption of a semi-presidential regime through constitutional change (as in the case of France and Portugal). For the East European countries information is collected from the formation of the first government after the adoption of a democratic semi-presidential regime through constitutional change. The dataset includes information on governments up to Dec 2003, or up to the point at which constitutional changes end the semi-presidential regime.

The data consists of a Stata file "Schleiter_Semi-Presidential Cabinets.dta". The data records government attributes, as well as parliamentary attributes, presidential attributes, and constitutional attributes that describe the environments within which governments work. Cases in these files are defined as individual governments.

The collection of this dataset was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, Grant Reference No. RES-000-22-0365). Project principal: Dr
Petra Schleiter, St Hilda’s College and Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. Research officer: Emma Sell, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.
## Variables, coding rules and sources

### 1 Government Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>caseno</td>
<td>Government id</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country</td>
<td>Country name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countrys</td>
<td>Country id</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>govtnumb</td>
<td>Number of government</td>
<td>Note: Continuous numbering of all democratic governments since the end of WWII, or since the adoption of a semi-presidential constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>termdate</td>
<td>Government termination date</td>
<td>Note: date of formal resignation or date of the election which constitutionally terminates government, whichever is earlier.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
elprox  **Proximity of cabinet formation to election**  
*Coding*: Within 6 months after parliamentary election = 1, More than six months after presidential or parliamentary elections = 2, Within 6 months after presidential elections = 3  

regime  **Character of regime**  
*Coding*: President-parliamentary = 1, premier-presidential = 0  

technic  **Character of government**  
*Coding*: Technical = 1, Non-technical = 0  
*Note*: Technical governments are defined as governments in which over 50% of the ministers have no party affiliation.  

govtype  **Government type**  
*Coding*: Technical = 0, Unified = 1, Cohabitation = 2  
*Note*: Technical governments are defined as governments in which over 50% of the ministers have no party affiliation. Unified government is defined as a situation in which the president is a member of /affiliated with a party in government. Cohabitation is defined as a situation in which the president is not a member of /affiliated with any party in government.

termin  **Preceding government ended by discretionary parliamentary termination**  
*Coding*: Discretionary parliamentary termination = 1, Otherwise = 0.  
*Note*: Discretionary parliamentary terminations are defined as terminations caused by early parliamentary elections, voluntary enlargement of coalition, government defeat by opposition in parliament, termination of acting government by formation of a new government, conflict between coalition parties, intra-party conflict in coalition party or parties.

**Cause of termination code/s**

*Note:* Text column coding one or several causes of termination.

*Coding:*

**Technical terminations coding:**
- 1 = Regular presidential or parliamentary elections which require government termination
- 2 = Other constitutional reason
- 3 = Death/ Illness of PM
- 3.5 = Government not terminated by Dec 31 2003
- 3.51 = Termination of caretaker government by elections that were arranged before the caretaker government took office.

**Discretionary termination coding:**
- 4 = Early parliamentary elections
- 5 = Voluntary enlargement of coalition
- 6 = Cabinet defeated by opposition in parliament
- 6.5 = Acting government terminated by formation of new government
- 7 = Conflict between coalition parties
- 7.5 = Cabinet dismissed by president
- 8 = Intra-party conflict in coalition party or parties
- 8.5 = Assembly dissolution by president

**Critical event termination coding:**
- 9 = Discretionary resignation after parliamentary/presidential or other election which does not constitutionally require cabinet termination
- 10 = Popular opinion shocks
- 11 = International or national security event
- 12 = Economic event
- 13 = Personal event
- 14 = President/PM conflict
- 15 = Insurrection/ Riots

**history**  **Character of previous government**

*Coding:* Technical = 1, Otherwise = 0

*Note:* history = technical lagged by 1.


**majstat**  **Majority status of government**

*Coding:* Technical = 0, Minority = 1, Majority = 2
Note: technical = technic, Minority and Majority defined by percentage of assembly seats controlled by governing party/coalition, based on the previous election results. Minority (0-50%), Majority (50.1-100%)


duration  Duration of government in days
Note: Number of days from government taking office (formdate) to government termination (termdate).

maxdays  Maximum potential duration of government in days
Note: The potential duration of government in days from time of taking office (formdate) to next constitutionally scheduled election date, defined by constitutional inter-election period (CIEP).
Coding: nextelecta/p - formdate

daysdiff  Difference between actual government duration in days and potential maximum duration of government in days.
Note: Difference in days between actual government duration (duration) and potential duration according to CIEP (maxdays).

defgovt  Definition of new government
Note: Reason for identifying new cabinet according to Müller & Strøm (2000) criteria.
Coding:
1 = A change in the party composition of the government/ or in non-partisan governments a change of 50% or more of cabinet members with voting rights
2 = A change of the head of government
3 = Government formation following an election.
These reasons for counting a new government are not mutually exclusive and several of them may apply at the same time. The
different combinations of reasons for counting a new government are coded as follows:

Aggregation rule: \(1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3, 4 = 1+2, 5 = 1+3, 6 = 2+3, 7 = 1+2+3\)

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

Technical

Technical cause of government termination

Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).

Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred for technical reason (cause of termination code/s 1 – 3.51), otherwise = 0

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

discretionary

Discretionary cause of government termination

Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).

Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred for discretionary reason (cause of termination code/s 4-8.5), otherwise = 0

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

event

Government termination triggered by critical events:

Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).

Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred following a critical event (cause of termination code/s 9-15), otherwise = 0

Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.

cause

Cause of termination

Note: Text column describing reason for cabinet termination


gvtseats

Government strength in parliamentary seats

Note: Number of seats held by governing party/parties based on results of last parliamentary election.


singlmaj

Single party majority in government

Coding: Single party majority = 1, otherwise = 0

Notes: Single party majority coded if a single party forms the government and controls at least 50.1% of the assembly seats.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Note</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>assuppre</td>
<td>Assembly support for government pre-parliamentary election</td>
<td>Majority = 0 (0-50%), Majority = 1 (50.1-66.65%), Super-majority (66.66-100%) = 2</td>
<td>Amount of support in the assembly for the government by percentage of seat shares before an election, based on the previous election results.</td>
<td>parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assupos</td>
<td>Assembly support for government post-election</td>
<td>Majority = 0 (0-50%), Majority = 1 (50.1-66.65%), Super-majority (66.66-100%) = 2</td>
<td>Amount of support in the assembly for the government by percentage of seat shares after an election. For regimes in which the constitution does not require the resignation of the government following parliamentary elections, this variable may differ from assuppre.</td>
<td>parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese Parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Parliamentary attributes

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**prctmaj** Percentage of majority based governments during constitutional era

*Note:* A constitutional era is delimited by constitutional changes (coded in `datechange`) that alter the relationship between president and parliament, thus creating a new regime.


**parldate** Date of parliamentary election

*Note:* Date on which parliamentary election took place – if several rounds, latest date used.


Birch 2003

**enp** Effective number of parliamentary parties

*Coding:* Laakso-Taagepera Index

*Note:* Data for WEU post-2000 unavailable; 2000 data used.


**enp2** Effective number of parliamentary parties

*Coding:* Laakso-Taagepera Index, based on authors’ own calculations using parliamentary election outcomes (see sources for parldate, prctmaj)

**volat** Electoral volatility

*Note:* Birch – Volatility = the amount of change observed within the set of parties that contest two consecutive elections (data available to 2002). To obtain the ‘true’ volatility score it is necessary to divide by the sum of the fractional shares of the total vote at each election of the parties which are included in the calculations.

*Calculation of indices in Birch (2003) are based on the most comparable figures, thus figures are based on SMD and PR for some cases – comments in cells highlight these cases.*
Warwick – Half sum of proportional changes in parliamentary strengths of parties from one election to the next (data available to 1987, data unavailable for France).


**volatbp** Pedersen volatility score

*Note:* The Pedersen volatility score - the amount of change observed within the set of parties that contest two consecutive elections (data available to 2002) using 2 as a denominator. *This measure is more directly comparable with Warwick's data.*


### 3 Presidential Attributes

**presdate** Date of presidential election

*Note:* Date on which presidential election took place – if more than one date or run-off then latest date/ run off date used

*Source:* Psephos, Rulers, *"Election Results Archive"* Election Results Archive (WEU, Croatia, Slovenia), *"Lijphart Elections Archive"* Lijphart Elections Archive (Finland), "Statistics Finland" Statistics Finland, "Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer Rückblick" Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU)

**presinaug** Date of presidential inauguration

*Note:* Date on which president begins tenure


**electpres** Nature of presidential election

*Note:* Popular election = 0, Election by parliament = 1


**president** Name of president

*Note:* Name of president and party affiliation/association

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Coding</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prespart</td>
<td>Party membership of president</td>
<td>Party affiliation = 1, otherwise = 0.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sources: see president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unified</td>
<td>Unified or divided government</td>
<td>Unified = 1, Divided = 0</td>
<td>Based on party affiliation of president and coalition/party make-up of government at time of cabinet formation. Unified government is coded when the president is a member of/associated with a party in government.</td>
<td>Sources: Müller &amp; Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU &amp; FSU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presctrl</td>
<td>Degree of presidential control over government</td>
<td>Technical = 0, Single party majority = 1, single party minority = 2, coalition majority = 3, coalition minority = 4, cohabitation = 5. Coding rules for technical, majority and minority as for majstat.</td>
<td>Based on party affiliation of president and coalition/party make-up of government at time of cabinet formation.</td>
<td>Sources: Müller &amp; Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU &amp; FSU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presupre</td>
<td>Presidential support for government pre-presidential election</td>
<td>Amount of presidential support for the government based on party affiliation at last election.</td>
<td>Does not support government = 0, Supports government = 1, Supports government and government has a super-majority in parliament = 2</td>
<td>Sources: Müller &amp; Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU &amp; FSU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presupos</td>
<td>Presidential support for government post-presidential election</td>
<td>Amount of presidential support for the government based on party affiliation.</td>
<td>Does not support government = 0, Supports government = 1, Supports government and government has a super-majority in parliament = 2</td>
<td>Sources: Müller &amp; Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU &amp; FSU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presdis</td>
<td>Presidential involvement in cabinet dismissal</td>
<td>President not involved = 0, Assembly dissolution by president = 1, Cabinet dismissal by president = 2, Cabinet resignation requested by president = 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Constitutional Attributes

Sources for all constitutional variables:

Croatia -
Moldova –
"The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova" Constitution Finder
Ukraine -
"President of Ukraine" President of Ukraine
Iceland –
Icelandic Constitution
Portugal -
"Constitution Finder" , "Constitución De La República Portuguesa" Constitution Finder
Finland –
Iceland –
All other countries – "International Constitutional Law" International Constitutional Law

constdate Date of Constitutional change

legpow Legislative power of president

Note: Legislative powers of president according to the Constitution using Schleiter coding

Aggregation rule – Positive legislative powers (Decree, legislative initiative, referenda) multiplied by policy responsibility. Then add sum of negative powers (package veto and judicial review).

Coding:
Decrees (Legislative)
4 Reserved powers, no recission
3 Reserved powers in limited policy areas/ until legislation is adopted
2 President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
1 Authority to enact decrees limited to states or emergency/martial
law, or by countersignature of government/minister
0 No decree powers, or only as delegated by assembly

*Legislative Initiative*
4 Unrestricted right of legislative initiative
1 President can exercise legislative initiative only with
governmental/ministerial countersignature
0 No power of legislative initiative

*Proposal of Referenda*
4 Unrestricted
1.5 President can call a referendum only at proposal or with the
approval of govt
1 President can call a referendum only at the proposal or with the
approval of parliament
0 No power to initiate a referendum

*Package Veto/Override*
4 No override
3 Override by extraordinary majority
2 Override by absolute majority of whole membership
1 Override by simple majority of quorum (default code when no
specific provisions on override)
0 No veto

*Judicial Review (prior to promulgation)*
4 President alone refers
2 President, cabinet or majority of assembly refer
1 President, cabinet or minority of assembly refer
0 President may not refer or no prior judicial review

*Policy Responsibility*
4 Foreign & Domestic (e.g. president presides in Council of
Ministers and/or has explicit domestic policy responsibilities)
2 Foreign, Security, Emergency
1.5 Security/ Emergency only
1 Presidential responsibility can be exercised only upon govt
initiative/ with govt countersignature
0 None

**polresp** *Policy responsibility of president*

*Note*: Policy responsibility of the president according to the
Constitution using Schleiter coding. See *legpow*
cabpow

**Presidential cabinet related powers**

*Note:* Cabinet related powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding

**Aggregation rule:** Cabinet termination (average of technical cabinet termination, cabinet dismissal and censure) plus cabinet formation plus assembly dissolution powers

**Coding:**

*Cabinet Termination (average technical cabinet termination, cabinet dismissal and censure)*

**Technical Cabinet Termination**

4 After presidential elections
2 After presidential and parliamentary elections
0 After parliamentary elections

*Cabinet Dismissal by president*

4 President dismisses cabinet at will
1.5 President may initiate dismissal of ministers, but needs approval of the PM
1 President may initiate dismissal of cabinet, but requires approval of the assembly/advisory body
0 Cabinet/ministers may only be dismissed by assembly/at initiative of PM

*Censure - No Confidence Vote*

4 No censure
3 Censure of cabinet by assembly gives president discretionary/mandatory power to dissolve the assembly
2 Censure requires government resignation, which may be rejected by president (possibly on advice of PM)
1 Constructive vote of no confidence
0 Unrestricted censure (through single or repeated no confidence votes)

*Cabinet Formation*

4 President appoints PM and/or cabinet without need for assembly approval
3 President appoints PM and/or cabinet after consultation or with consent of assembly (e.g. no formal investiture vote required), and president has first move in all rounds of appointment process
2 President nominates PM, who needs confirmation/investiture by the assembly; PM proposes/appoints other cabinet ministers (president has first move in all rounds of appointment process)
1 President nominates PM, who needs confirmation/investiture by the assembly; PM proposes/appoints other cabinet ministers (president only has first move in first round of appointment process)
0 Parliament proposes PM, president appoints

Assembly Dissolution
4 Unrestricted
3 Restricted by frequency or point within term
2 Requires/ may prompt early presidential elections
1.5 In response to no confidence vote/ failure to adopt budget/ legislative deadlock
1 In response to failed government formation, or only at proposal of government/PM
0 No provision, or dissolution only when assembly fails to convene

formpow  Cabinet formation powers of president
Note: Cabinet formation powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding. See cabpow

dissmiss  Cabinet dismissal powers of president
Note: Cabinet dismissal powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding. See cabpow

dissolut  Assembly dissolution power of president
Note: Assembly dissolution powers of president according to the constitution using Schleiter coding. See cabpow

totpow   Total presidential powers
Note: Total presidential powers according to constitution using Schleiter coding
Aggregation rule: legpow plus cabpow

scleg    Shugart and Carey presidential legislative powers
Note: Legislative presidential powers according to Constitution using Shugart and Carey (1992) coding
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally given by Shugart and Carey (1992).
Aggregation rule: Additive

Coding:

Package Veto/Override
4 Veto with no override
3 Veto with override requiring greater than 2/3 (of quorum)
2 Veto with override requiring 2/3
1 Veto with override requiring absolute majority of assembly or extraordinary majority less than 2/3
0 No veto; or veto requires only simple majority to override

Partial Veto/Override
4 No override
3 Override by extraordinary majority
2 Override by absolute majority of whole membership
1 Override by simple majority of quorum
0 No partial veto

Decree
4 Reserved powers, no recission
2 President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
1 Authority to enact decrees limited (interpreted to include legislative decree powers during states of emergency and decrees that require parliamentary approval)
0 No decree powers; or only as delegated by assembly

Exclusive introduction of legislation (reserved policy areas)
4 No amendments by assembly
2 Restricted amendment by assembly
1 Unrestricted amendment by assembly
0 No exclusive powers

Budgetary Powers
4 President prepares budget; no amendment permitted
3 Assembly may reduce but not increase amount of budgetary items
2 President sets upper limit on total spending within which assembly may amend
1 Assembly may increase expenditures only if it designates new revenues
0 Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare or amend budget

Proposal of referenda
4 Unrestricted
2 Restricted
0 No presidential authority to propose referenda

Shugart and Carey presidential cabinet powers
Note: Presidential cabinet powers according to constitution using Shugart and Carey 1992 coding (changes to coding in italics)
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally given by Shugart and Carey (1992).

Aggregation rule: Additive
Coding:

Cabinet formation
4 President names cabinet without need for confirmation or investiture
3 President names cabinet ministers subject to confirmation or investiture by assembly
1 President names premier, subject to investiture who then names other ministers
0 President cannot name ministers except on recommendation of assembly

Cabinet dismissal
4 President dismisses cabinet or ministers at will
2 Restricted powers of dismissal
1 President may dismiss only upon acceptance by assembly of alternative minister or cabinet
0 Cabinet or ministers may be censured and removed by assembly (includes removal by president on approval of assembly).

Censure
4 Assembly may not censure and remove cabinet or ministers
2 Assembly may censure but president may respond by dissolving assembly
1 “Constructive” vote of no confidence (assembly majority must present alternative cabinet)
0 Unrestricted censure

Dissolution of Assembly
4 Unrestricted
3 Restricted by frequency of point within term
2 Requires new presidential election
1 Restricted: only as response to censures (or as a result of legislative factors, or as a response to failure to form government)

sctotal  Shugart and Carey total presidential powers
Note: Total presidential powers according to constitution using Shugart and Carey (1992) coding
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally given by Shugart and Carey (1992).
Aggregation rule: Additive cabinet powers and legislative powers

nexteleca Next assembly election date according to constitution
Note: Date of next constitutionally scheduled election, which triggers government change. Where the constitution is silent regarding the termination of governments following either type of
election, the coding reflects political practice rather than constitutional norms

**Coding rule:** parldate + ciepa


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**nextelecp**  
**Next presidential election date according to constitution**  
**Note:** Date of next constitutionally scheduled election, which triggers government change. Where the constitution is silent regarding the termination of governments following either type of election, the coding reflects political practice rather than constitutional norms  
**Coding rule:** presdate + ciepp  
**Source:** Psephos, Rulers, "Election Results Archive" Election Results Archive (WEU, Croatia, Slovenia), "Lijphart Elections Archive" Lijphart Elections Archive (Finland), "Statistics Finland" Statistics Finland, "Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer Rückblick" Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU), Constitutions

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**ciepa**  
**Constitutional inter-election (parliamentary) period**  
**Note:** Number of days, according to the Constitution, to next parliamentary election that would trigger government change  
**Source:** Constitutions

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**ciepp**  
**Constitutional inter-election period of president**  
**Note:** Number of days, according to the Constitution, to next presidential election that would trigger government change  
**Source:** Constitutions
References:


The Parliament of Finland

Ministry for Foreign Affairs


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